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INTRODUCTION
When Tasha was only thirteen, her mother died of a drug
overdose. With no other relatives and nowhere to go, Tasha moved
in with a family friend. Although she had a home, the situation soon
turned abusive. Struggling with the trauma of her mother’s death
and her abusive home life, Tasha was desperate for stability. When
she began dating an older man, Tasha thought she had finally found
the love and support she so badly needed. After a few months,
however, Tasha’s boyfriend told her that if she wanted the relation-
ship to continue, she would need to do her part to contribute. If they
could save up enough money, he said, they could buy a nice house
and start a family together. Although she was too young to hold a
job, the man explained, she could easily make a few hundred dollars
per night working as a prostitute. He knew a number of places to
easily recruit her plenty of customers.
Soon enough, Tasha realized that she was trapped. Despite her
boyfriend’s promise to start a family together, he kept all of the
money she earned working the streets. No longer attending school,
Tasha had nowhere to turn and no one to ask for help. Leaving was
not an option. She had no money, and she feared that if she tried to
exit prostitution, her boyfriend would kill her.1 If she went to the
police, she would face criminal charges for prostitution.2
Unfortunately, Tasha’s situation is not uncommon. Commercial
sexual exploitation3 of minors is a rapidly growing phenomenon.4 In
1. Leaving a pimp can be dangerous for commercially sexually exploited children,
referred to in this Note as “CSEC youth.” See Jeannine Amber, Black Girls for Sale, ESSENCE
MAG., Oct. 2010, at 164, 168, http://www.jeannineamber.com/uploads/stories/black%20
girls%20for%20sale%20.pdf (quoting an officer of the Oakland Police Department (OPD) in
Alameda County who explains that he has seen “skull fractures, broken bones, girls who’ve
been stabbed, shot, whipped, chopped into pieces, their bodies stuffed in garbage pails” at the
hands of pimps).
2. This vignette is a composite of real stories based on the writer’s previous work with
CSEC youth in Alameda County, California and Essex County, New Jersey. Unfortunately,
this story is representative of the experiences of many CSEC youth. The youths’ names and
the identifying features of their stories have been changed in order to protect their privacy.
3. For the purposes of this discussion, the prostitution of minors under eighteen is
referred to as “commercial sexual exploitation” or “CSEC exploitation” in the “CSEC market.”
Some sources use this term to refer only to situations in which a youth is exploited by a
“pimp,” but not to refer to youth who choose to sell themselves independently. This Note uses
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2005, Congress updated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA) to explicitly provide youth like Tasha with immunity from
criminal charges for prostitution.5 Recently, a number of states have
begun to adopt similar policies, often called “safe harbor” laws,
limiting the prosecution of such youth.6 Nonetheless, only two states
have provided these youth complete immunity from prosecution,7
and many states have yet to create any safe harbor policy at all.8 
California has one of the largest populations of commercially
sexually exploited children (CSEC).9 In the United States as a
whole, an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 youth are involved in
prostitution per year.10 Due to lack of reporting, officials have not
yet compiled solid estimates for the state of California.11 The
this term to refer to all youth involved in prostitution, regardless of involvement with a pimp,
in recognition that prostitution is a commercial transaction that inherently exploits any youth
involved in it.
4. Admin. for Children & Families, What Is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/about-human-
trafficking. The problem is specifically growing in Alameda County. See Amber, supra note
1, at 169.
5. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7102 (2006); see Wendi J. Adelson, Child Prostitute or Victim of
Trafficking?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 96, 101 (2008) (“The legislators in favor of TVPA did not
just intend to punish the victims less severely—they desired to move away from a model of
punishment for victims entirely.”).
6. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82 (2012); Illinois Safe Children Act, 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/11-14(d) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d) (2012); Melissa Golke, Note, The Age
of Consent: How Minnesota’s Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Youth Act of 2011 Falls
Short of Fully Addressing Domestic Child Sex Trafficking, 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 201,
202 (2012).
7. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(d); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d).
8. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS USED TO CHARGE
CHILDREN FOR COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION (2012),
available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Statutory%20Frameworks%20Used%20to%20Charge%
20Children%20for%20CSEC%20&%20Alternatives%20to%20Prosecution_3.1.12.pdf (listing
all states’ policies, or lack thereof, regarding the prosecution of minors for criminal charges
of prostitution).
9. Other sources may refer to such youth as “sexually exploited minors,” “commercially
sexually exploited minors,” or “juveniles involved in prostitution.” Because “CSEC” also refers
to the market for the “commercial sexual exploitation of children,” this Note refers to “CSEC
youth” as children who are victims of “CSEC prostitution,” “CSEC exploitation,” or the “CSEC
market.”
10. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Hearing on H.R. 5575 Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17 (2010).
11. See Carolyn Liu, Community-Based Services for Youth Involved in Prostitution: A
Grant Proposal Project 1 (May 2009) (M.S.W. thesis, California State University, Long Beach),
available at http://gradworks.umi.com/1466116.pdf; Manev Tanneeru, The Challenges of
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers the metropolitan
areas of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco to be some of
the largest CSEC markets in the United States.12 Within the San
Francisco metropolitan area, the problem is especially acute in
Alameda County. For example, in Oakland, the largest city in
Alameda County, police estimate that about 100 CSEC youth are
involved in prostitution on any given night.13 
Despite its large CSEC market,14 California lacks a safe harbor
policy. In 2008, California implemented a pilot program in Alameda
County, allowing minors arrested on charges of prostitution to enter
a diversion program in which they receive rehabilitative services
and counseling, rather than accepting a conviction for prostitution.15
Many government and law enforcement officials support the pilot
program, claiming it is the only effective method of physically
breaking youth away from pimps and their former lifestyles to
provide them with the services they need in order to successfully
leave prostitution.16 Furthermore, many officials hope to see the
Counting a ‘Hidden Population’, CNN FREEDOM PROJECT (Mar. 9, 2011), http://thecnnfreedom
project.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/09/slavery-numbers/. 
12. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S EFFORTS TO COMBAT CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 21 (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0908/final.pdf.
13. Barbara Grady, Youth Trafficking in Oakland: Big Business Despite Government,
Police Efforts, OAKLAND LOC. (May 12, 2010), http://live.oaklandlocal.com/article/youth-
trafficking-part-1 (quoting OPD officers).
14. Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Conceptualizing Juvenile Prostitution as Child
Maltreatment: Findings from the National Juvenile Prostitution Study, 15 CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT 18, 20 (2010) (citing a study that found that Los Angeles and San Francisco had the two
highest arrest rates of youth on charges of prostitution in the entire country); Child
Prostitution Growth in Alameda County Outpaces Police Efforts, CBS S.F. (Aug. 9, 2011)
[hereinafter Child Prostitution Growth], http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/08/09/police-
struggling-to-keep-pace-with-growing-child-prostitution-problem-in-alameda-county/ (stating
that in 2009, 426 of the 893 youth prostitution arrests reported to the FBI occurred in
California, 69 of those arrests occurred in Los Angeles, and 76 occurred in Oakland).
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18259 (West 2012).
16. See Mary K. Flynn, As More Oakland Youth Join the Sex Trade, Law Enforcement
Explores Alternatives to Incarceration, OAKLAND N. (March 13, 2010 10:02 AM),
http://oaklandnorth.net/2010/03/13/as-more-oakland-youth-join-the-sex-trade-law-
enforcement-explores-alternatives-to-incarceration/ (quoting Alameda County Deputy District
Attorney).
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pilot program adopted as the official statewide policy.17 Many would
like to see the program replicated in other parts of the country.18 
Leaders of various community organizations providing services
to these youth, however, support an alternative policy, which would
grant youth under eighteen immunity from prosecution.19 Unlike
diversion, immunity would not subject youth to detention by law
enforcement, court proceedings, or mandatory rehabilitative
programs.20 Rather, CSEC youth would face no criminal charges,
and they would be free to pursue voluntary rehabilitative services.21
This Note argues that Alameda County should replace its
current diversion program with a policy of immunity. Part One
describes Alameda County’s current policy of diversion and outlines
alternative programs used in other states. Part Two presents
various legal arguments as to why immunity is the most appropri-
ate policy for combating CSEC exploitation in Alameda County,
given the context of California state laws. Part Three presents
various policy arguments as to why immunity is the most appropri-
ate approach in this part of the country, given the distinct manner
in which CSEC exploitation occurs in Alameda County. Finally, Part
Four considers and responds to concerns that critics have voiced
regarding immunity. 
Various scholarly articles have analyzed many of the possible
benefits and drawbacks that accompany alternative policies
regarding CSEC exploitation. Much of this work is theoretical and
considers the issue in a general context.22 This Note is unique in
17. California has considered expanding Alameda County’s diversion policy to the rest of
the state. WELF. & INST. § 18259.1. It is already in the process of implementing a similar
diversion policy in Los Angeles County. Id. § 18259.7.
18. See, e.g., Amber, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting the Executive Director of End Child
Prostitution and Trafficking, USA).
19. Flynn, supra note 16 (quoting the Executive Director of MISSSEY, an organization
serving CSEC youth in Alameda County).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. For examples of pieces providing a theoretical, rather than applied, analysis of legal
approaches to CSEC, see generally Adelson, supra note 5 (explaining why CSEC youth are
properly viewed as victims); Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging
Legal Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
1 (2011) (discussing issues of consent and comparing the legal theories contained in various
state safe harbor laws); Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy,
and Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055 (2011) (assessing prostitution laws in
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that it considers how advantages and disadvantages of certain
policies unfold specifically in Alameda County. This Note focuses on
Alameda County because it is the epicenter of the CSEC market
within the United States, and other jurisdictions are looking to
Alameda County for an answer.23 By adopting a policy of immunity,
as advocated by this Note, Alameda County would implement a
policy that fits appropriately within state laws and the nature of the
local CSEC market. In doing so, it may persuade other policymakers
to consider similar factors when deciding upon a policy appropriate
for their own jurisdictions.
I. CURRENT LEGAL RESPONSES TO CSEC EXPLOITATION
A. Current Policies in Alameda County and California
Because CSEC exploitation has become a growing problem in
Alameda County and the rest of California, government and law
enforcement officials have begun to take steps to combat this issue.
light of the status of CSEC youth as criminals and noting that the advantages of Alameda
County’s pilot diversion program have not yet been assessed as applied with data-based
analysis); Susan Crile, A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking
Legislation Preempt the Enforcement of State Prostitution Laws Against Minors, 61 AM. U. L.
REV. 1783 (2012) (discussing how the Supremacy Clause, statutory interpretation, and
legislative intent of TVPA preempt state laws that criminalize the actions of CSEC youth);
Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523 (2000)
(assessing legal theories in light of labor rights and issues of victimization that arise in
prostitution). Some recent scholarship focuses on the appropriateness of safe harbor laws as
applied to the context of a particular state, but no authors have focused on California. For an
example of work on state-specific safe harbor laws, see generally Angela L. Bergman, For
Their Own Good? Exploring Legislative Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of
Children and the Illinois Safe Children Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1361, 1366 (2012) (assessing
how Illinois’s safe harbor law has, in practice, presented issues involving police discretion and
the return of youth to their abusers); Cheryl Nelson Butler, Sex Slavery in the Lone Star
State: Does the Texas Human Trafficking Legislation of 2011 Protect Minors?, 45 AKRON L.
REV. 843, 847 (2012) (assessing Texas’s safe harbor law in the context of state antiprostitution
laws and providing child labor statistics in various industries throughout the state); Golke,
supra note 6, at 202 (assessing Minnesota’s safe harbor law against state laws regarding
juvenile criminal records, local barriers to data collection, and state funding).
23. See Amber, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting the Executive Director of End Child
Prostitution and Trafficking, USA); Heather Gilligan, Oakland Confronting Child
Prostitution, Sex Trafficking, CALIF. WATCH (Oct. 17, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/daily
report/oakland-confronting-child-prostitution-sex-trafficking-13097 (quoting author Julian
Sher).
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Various police departments, for instance, have created task forces
specifically dedicated to curtailing exploitation. In 2004 and 2005,
the United States Department of Justice provided grants to fund six
regional task forces in California, led by local police departments
and nongovernmental organizations, to focus on human
trafficking.24 Today, there are nine such task forces throughout the
state, in the East Bay, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Orange County,
San Diego, San Jose, Riverside, Sacramento, and Fresno.25 The East
Bay regional task force, led by the Oakland Police Department
(OPD), received a federal grant in 2006 to focus on human traffick-
ing, including CSEC exploitation.26 In addition, Assembly Bill 499,
passed in 2008 and renewed by Assembly Bill 799 in 2011, imple-
mented a diversion program in Alameda County for CSEC youth
arrested on charges of prostitution.27
Under the pilot program, if Tasha was arrested in Alameda
County on suspicion of prostitution and deemed to be involved in or
at risk of exploitation by a pimp, she would be temporarily detained.
During this time, she would be housed with other girls who had
been arrested on other violent and nonviolent charges.28 In some
ways, Tasha’s experience as a CSEC youth arrested for prostitution
would differ from that of youth arrested on other charges. For
example, before her court hearing, Tasha would receive an advocate
from Bay Area Women Against Rape who would support her during
interrogation.29 She would also receive services from local nonprofit
groups.30 
In other ways, though, Tasha’s experience would be much the
same as that of youth arrested on other charges. During the two
week period pending her court hearings, Tasha would be housed in
24. Office of the Att’y Gen., Fighting Human Trafficking, STATE OF CALIF. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://oag.ca.gov/human-trafficking/fighting (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
25. Id.
26. Id.; So Young: Underage Prostitution, By the Numbers, ALAMEDA PATCH (Aug. 16,
2011), http://alameda.patch.com/articles/so-young-underage-prostitution-by-the-numbers.
27. Assembly Bill 499 is codified as CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18259 (West 2012), and
Assembly Bill 799 is codified as CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 18259.1 (2012).
28. WELF. & INST. § 18259; Alameda County Grapples with Best Way to Rescue Teen
Prostitutes, CBS S.F. (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter County Grapples], http://sanfrancisco.cbs
local.com/2011/08/11/alameda-county-grapples-with-best-way-to-rescue-teen-prostitutes/.
29. Flynn, supra note 16.
30. County Grapples, supra note 28.
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“cinderblock cells containing only [her] clothes, a sink, and two
platform beds.”31 The cells are part of larger units, each of which has
“several cells arranged on two floors surrounding an open common
area with fixed tables.”32 Like all other youth in juvenile detention,
Tasha would have to wear the clothing given to her by the detention
center, and she would not be allowed to move about freely.33 When
walking down the hall, Tasha would be required to clasp her hands
behind her back, like “invisible handcuffs,” and “[v]isitors ... [would
have to] stand against the wall until [she] pass[ed].”34 Later, once
the initial stages of the proceedings against Tasha had commenced,
the court could release her to the community and drop prostitution
charges, as long as she agreed to enter a “diversion program.”35 
Unfortunately, many CSEC youth like Tasha are ineligible for
diversion, and they are instead prosecuted for prostitution. For
example, girls who have had multiple arrests and who have endured
years of commercial sexual exploitation may be ineligible for
diversion. Likewise, girls who are less willing to cooperate with the
courts may not be allowed the option of diversion. Instead, the
prosecutor will generally charge them with a misdemeanor, often
involving a sentence of ninety days in detention.36 
B. Policies in Other States
Alameda County’s diversion policy can be categorized as
“conditional diversion,” in which “youth may be criminalized
depending on their ‘compliance’ and in which only certain youth
qualify for diversion based upon [specified] factors.”37 Currently,
both Washington and Minnesota have similar conditional diversion
programs for CSEC youth. In Washington, all minors under
eighteen charged with their first offense of prostitution are
31. Id.
32. Id. 
33. Sarah Terry-Cobo, Oakland’s Sexually Trafficked Youth: Arrest or Treat These
Victims?, OAKLAND LOC. (May 7, 2010), http://live.oaklandlocal.com/article/youth-trafficking-
part-6.
34. Id. 
35. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18259 (West 2012); County Grapples, supra note 28.
36. Flynn, supra note 16. 
37. Annitto, supra note 22, at 62 n.336. 
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mandatorily diverted out of juvenile court.38 For a minor facing
repeat offenses, however, eligibility for diversion is uncertain. In
these cases, the prosecutor must exercise his discretion to allow
diversion. Additionally, the court must find that the county in which
the youth committed the offense provides sufficient diversion
services.39 According to the safe harbor law in Minnesota, youth
facing charges of prostitution40 will be diverted from juvenile court
on the condition that they accept and comply with the diversion
program.41 Youth with previous charges of prostitution, however,
will be deemed ineligible.42
Other states take a different approach, in which the court will
drop prostitution charges if the court finds that a CSEC youth
committed the alleged offense simply because another person forced
her to do so. Some of these states place the burden of proof on the
child to show that she was indeed coerced.43 Connecticut law,
however, presumes coercion, placing the burden on the prosecution
to prove otherwise.44
For youth under age sixteen, Connecticut provides even greater
protection by allowing them immunity from prosecution.45 Recently,
a few other states have passed similar laws providing immunity to
CSEC youth of certain ages. In Minnesota, for instance, minors up
to age fifteen are immune from prosecution for prostitution.46
Tennessee has extended immunity from prosecution for prostitution
to minors up to age seventeen.47 Under Tennessee’s safe harbor
statute, police are authorized to detain youth for a reasonable
amount of time. Nevertheless, once officers determine that the
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070 (2012).
39. See id. § 13.40.070, 40.213.
40. Under the Minnesota Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Youth Act, youth under age
sixteen are immune from being prosecuted for prostitution. Golke, supra note 6, at 203; see
also ECPAT-USA, HIGHLIGHTS OF MINNESOTA’S SAFE HARBOR FOR SEXUALLY EXPLOITED
CHILDREN LAW 1 (2011) (on file with author).
41. ECPAT-USA, supra note 40, at 2; Golke, supra note 6, at 233 n.98.
42. See ECPAT-USA, supra note 40, at 2.
43. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 710A.3 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.223(2) (2012); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 748(D) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.269 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34.1-2(d) (2012).
44. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82 (2012). 
45. Id.
46. ECPAT-USA, supra note 40, at 1; Golke, supra note 6, at 203. The same is true for
youth up to age fifteen in Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(a) (2012). 
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d) (2012).
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youth is under age eighteen, they must release the minor and
provide her with the phone number of the national human traffick-
ing resource center hotline.48 
Similar to Tennessee, the Safe Children Act of Illinois extends
immunity from prosecution for prostitution to minors up to age
seventeen, but it provides further details regarding police interac-
tion with the youth.49 Under this safe harbor law, police officers may
detain a youth for a reasonable period of time in order to investigate
the situation.50 However, once police determine that a detained
youth is under age eighteen, they can no longer detain her in a
detention facility or jail. Nonetheless, if the police suspect that the
youth is involved in human trafficking,51 she could still be subject to
temporary protective custody in the child welfare system such as in
a hospital, medical facility, foster home, or other licensed facility.52 
II. LEGAL SUPPORT FOR A POLICY OF IMMUNITY IN
ALAMEDA COUNTY
Alameda County could adopt any of the policy models currently
used by other states. Given the specific legal context in which a safe
harbor policy would be implemented in California, however,
immunity for youth under age eighteen is the policy most appropri-
ate for Alameda County.
A. Statutory Rape Laws in California
First, immunity for youth under eighteen would resolve tension
with California’s statutory rape laws. Currently, California law
states that an adult who engages in sexual intercourse with a minor
under eighteen commits statutory rape, in effect holding that
minors under that age cannot legally consent to sex with an adult.53
Alameda County’s diversion policy, however, continues to hold
children legally accountable for engaging in sexual intercourse with
48. Id.
49. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(d) (2012).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-5 to 2-7(2012).
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2012).
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an adult in the context of prostitution. Such policies thus create a
paradox—a child like Tasha is legally considered a criminal for
committing the same act for which she is also considered a victim of
statutory rape.54 In other words, Tasha would be held criminally
culpable for the same activity to which she is legally incapable of
consenting.55 One police officer has explained this irony by saying,
If a 45-year-old man had sex with a 14-year-old girl and no
money changed hands, she was likely to get counseling, and he
was likely to get jail time for statutory rape.... If the same man
left $80 on the table after having sex with her, she would
probably be locked up for prostitution and he would probably go
home with a fine as a john.56
A policy of immunity for youth under age eighteen would resolve
this contradiction by recognizing that minors like Tasha are victims
of crime in both situations. 
In many other states, statutory rape laws apply only when a
youth is under fifteen or sixteen, and/or only when the adult is more
than a certain number of years older than the youth involved.57 In
these states, prosecution of older teens involved in prostitution
would create less tension with statutory rape laws. Statutory rape
laws in California, however, are very strict, criminalizing inter-
course between an adult and a minor regardless of whether the
54. For a discussion on the paradox between the way in which minors are treated under
statutory rape laws and prostitution laws, see In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 821-22 (Tex. 2010)
(“It is difficult to reconcile the Legislature’s recognition of the special vulnerability of children,
and its passage of laws for their protection, with an intent to find that children under fourteen
understand the nature and consequences of their conduct when they agree to commit a sex
act for money, or to consider children quasi-criminal offenders guilty of an act that necessarily
involves their own sexual exploitation.”). But see In re Nicolette R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 487, 487
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
55. Annitto argues that children may be less capable of consenting to commercial
exchanges of sexual intercourse for money than to sexual intercourse in other contexts, saying
that one can “distinguish a minor’s inability to ‘consent’ in the context of sexual exploitation
from other areas of decision making that rely on cognitive, rather than psychosocial,
capacities.” Annitto, supra note 22, at 24. 
56. Ian Urbina, For Runaways on the Street, Sex Buys Survival, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/us/27runaways.html?pagewanted=all (quoting an
officer of the Dallas Police Department).
57. See generally AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW, 50 STATE SURVEY OF SEXUAL OFFENSES
AGAINST CHILDREN (STATUTORY RAPE) (2006) [hereinafter 50 STATE SURVEY],
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021769.pdf.
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minor is an older teen and regardless of the age difference between
them.58 Any safe harbor policy adopted by Alameda County should
account for the unique statutory rape laws in California. A policy of
immunity for youth under eighteen would do just that.
B. Prostitution Laws in California
Immunity for youth under age eighteen in Alameda County also
would resolve tension with state laws that prohibit the buying and
selling of minors for prostitution. Under the California Penal Code,
customers who solicit sex from underage prostitutes face harsher
penalties than those who solicit sex from adult prostitutes.59
Similarly, pimps who sell minors under age eighteen face harsher
penalties than those who sell adults.60 By distinguishing the buying
and selling of a minor under eighteen from the buying and selling
of an adult, the law recognizes that minors like Tasha are victims
in the context of commercial sexual exploitation.61 Like the state’s
statutory rape laws, these statutes against the solicitation and
trafficking of minors contradict alternative policies such as diver-
sion, which consider CSEC youth victims to also be criminals.
In contrast to California, many other states impose harsher
penalties for buying and selling only younger teens, such as those
under age sixteen or fourteen.62 For these states, prosecution of
older teens involved in prostitution creates less tension with laws
against solicitation and trafficking. California, however, recently
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2012).
59. Id. § 261.9.
60. Id. § 236.1.
61. Indeed, in analyzing Assembly Bill 12, later codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.9, the
California Senate Committee on Public Safety found that the bill demonstrated “legislative
intent to recast the state’s laws relating to human trafficking and child sex slavery to treat
the trafficked children as victims, rather than prostitutes.” Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 12,
CAL. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY (2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/
asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_12_cfa_20110614_111030_sen_comm.html. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.9
raises fines on customers who buy sexual services from minors under eighteen in order to
“fund programs and services for commercially sexually exploited minors.” CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261.9. The Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 17, later codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1, also
explicitly identified these youth as “victims” of a crime. Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 17, S.
RULES COMM. 1 (2009), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/ab_17_cfa_20090826_121925_sen_floor.html.
62. See generally 50 STATE SURVEY, supra note 57.
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decided to impose harsher penalties for trafficking and soliciting
youth specifically under the age of eighteen.63 A policy of immunity
therefore would make great sense in Alameda County, because it
would align with the state’s intent to identify all CSEC youth under
eighteen as victims of a crime.
C. The Federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act
Finally, a policy of immunity for youth under eighteen resolves
tension with the federal TVPA law. TVPA considers all minors
under eighteen involved in prostitution to be “severe[ly]” trafficked
persons requiring protection rather than prosecution, with no
additional requirement that they show “force, fraud, or coercion.”64
Under policies such as diversion, Tasha would be identified as a
criminal, even though TVPA considers her to be a “severe[ly]”
trafficked person who should not be prosecuted for prostitution.
Only a policy of immunity for youth under eighteen would align
with federal TVPA law.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF IMMUNITY
In addition to the legal rationales supporting immunity for
youth under eighteen in Alameda County, numerous policy
rationales exist as well. Namely, these policy rationales include: (1)
protection from wrongful prosecution, (2) preventing harm to CSEC
youth, and (3) ending CSEC exploitation. 
A. Protecting CSEC Youth from Wrongful Prosecution
1. Protecting All Youth Who Are True Victims
Critics of immunity commonly argue that this policy fails to hold
accountable those youth who voluntarily choose to become prosti-
tutes rather than being forced into prostitution by a pimp.65 This
concern may be more persuasive in other parts of the country, given
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64.  22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A) (2012).
65. See Mitchell et al., supra note 14, at 29 (finding that CSEC youth who are sold by a
pimp are six times more likely to be treated as a victim than those who sell themselves).
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that, nationally, about one-fourth of CSEC youth sell themselves
without going through a broker.66 This rationale is less persuasive
in Alameda County, however, where nearly all CSEC youth are
under the control of adult male pimps.67 
In Oakland, for example, police estimate that nearly all CSEC
youth work for a pimp.68 Pimp control of International Boulevard,
the main track,69 is broken down into an intricate system, in which
girls of different ages are sold on different blocks according to their
level of experience.70 This particular track stretches over forty
blocks.71 It is further connected to customers in cities throughout the
state ranging from Stockton, Sacramento, and San Diego, and even
out of state into Reno, Las Vegas, and Phoenix.72 Pimps control
these streets in a manner similar to that often associated with
gangs and drug dealers,73 as they exert nearly total control over a
well-organized CSEC market.74 If a minor female did attempt to sell
herself on her own in Alameda County without going through a
66. RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA AND MEXICO 60 (2001), http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/restes/
CSEC_Files/Complete_CSEC_020220.pdf.
67. See Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14 (quoting an OPD officer).
68. Id.
69. See id. (describing International Boulevard in Oakland as “the Track”). For the
purposes of this note, “track” refers to a network of any level, whether it is one street, one city,
or a connection of various cities, along which pimps regularly market CSEC youth to
customers. See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 66, at 13.
70. See Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14.
71. See id.
72. Amber, supra note 1 (quoting a former CSEC youth who describes how her pimp
trafficked her between Oakland and Stockton); California Lawmakers Creating Policy to
Target Pimps, CBS S.F. (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Lawmakers Creating Policy],
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/08/10/california-lawmakers-creating-policy-to-target-
child-prostitution/ (quoting police officers describing how pimps bring girls to the Marine
Corps base in San Diego, as well as to Las Vegas, Phoenix, and cities hosting sporting events
to pimp them out); Youth Radio, Trafficked Teen Girls Describe Life in ‘The Game’, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/06/131757019/youth-radio-trafficked-
teen-girls-describe-life-in-the-game (quoting a former CSEC youth who describes being
pimped out in Oakland and Sacramento).
73. See Amber, supra note 1, at 167; Memorandum from Los Angeles Dep’t of Children
& Family Servs., Response to January 10, 2012 Board Motion Item #2, Motion by Supervisor
Don Knabe: Human Trafficking 2 (Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter LADCFS], http://file.lacounty.
gov/bos/supdocs/70403.pdf. 
74. Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14.
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pimp, police estimate that she would last only two to three days
before being recruited by one.75 
Consequently, in Alameda County, a policy of immunity rarely
protects youth from prosecution who have, by their own will, chosen
to enter into prostitution. Nearly all CSEC youth in Alameda
County are under the control of a pimp. As a result, the risk in
Alameda County is not that independent CSEC youth will unfairly
escape prosecution, but rather that truly victimized youth like
Tasha will be unjustly prosecuted.
2. Protecting Youth Regardless of Age
Some critics believe that although teens such as Tasha are, to
some extent, coerced into prostitution, sixteen and seventeen year
old CSEC youth are old enough that the law should nonetheless
hold them legally accountable.76 Although this argument may be
more compelling in certain parts of the country, it is less persuasive
in Alameda County. As noted above, CSEC youth in Alameda
County enter and remain in prostitution primarily as a result of
coercion by pimps, rather than as a result of empowered individual
choice.77 Such coercion applies equally to both younger and older
teens, and many older teens in Alameda County even have certain
characteristics that increase their vulnerability to exploitation by
pimps.78 
Pimps primarily target vulnerable youth like Tasha who have
grown up lacking stable families and housing.79 Unfortunately,
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(a) (2012); Golke, supra note 6, at 203.
77. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
79. See HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN
TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10 (2009),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/#domestic (noting that in
various studies, one factor increasing vulnerability of domestic female juveniles to commercial
sexual exploitation was “a profound sense of being alone without resources,” given histories
of housing and family instability); ESTES & WEINER, supra note 66, at 2 (listing provision of
“subsistence needs” as the factor most frequently fueling CSEC exploitation); Grady, supra
note 13 (noting that pimps provide the shelter, food, and clothing that the youth need to
survive, as explained by CSEC youth in Oakland).
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given its high rate of child poverty,80 Alameda County provides
pimps with an “endless victim base” of vulnerable youth in situa-
tions similar to Tasha’s.81 Because these youth seek love and
support, pimps can often trick these children into believing that
they are in a romantic relationship.82 Then, the pimp traps the girl
in the relationship by breaking off other sources of support83 and by
using physical force and intimidation.84 At that point, the pimp can
coerce her to work for him as a prostitute.85 Data shows that CSEC
youth in Alameda County disproportionately come from back-
grounds that increase vulnerability to such coercion. Studies of
CSEC youth in Oakland have found that 53 percent had been placed
in a group home at some point in their lives,86 83 percent had run
away,87 and 64 percent had been raped prior to entering prostitu-
tion.88 
80. Thirty-three percent of all children in Oakland live below the poverty line, placing
Oakland, the largest city within Alameda County, within the top 25 worst cities in the country
for child poverty. Press Release,  Nat’l Ctr. for Children in Poverty, Researchers: Detroit,
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Milwaukee Lead Nation in Child Poverty (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.nccp.org/media/releases/pdf/release_136.pdf.
81. Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14 (quoting an OPD officer); see also Flynn,
supra note 16. 
82. See, e.g., Amber, supra note 1, at 168 (quoting a CSEC youth in Oakland who was first
subjected to commercial sexual exploitation when her “boyfriend” asked her to contribute);
Youth Radio, supra note 72 (quoting a former CSEC youth who explained that she was first
subjected to such exploitation when her “boyfriend” informed her that she needed to
contribute to their household); see also Youngbee Dale, California: No Justice for Trafficked
Children, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighbor
hood/rights-so-divine/2012/feb/25/california-no-justice-trafficked-children/ (quoting a former
CSEC youth in California who explained how her pimp filled an emotional void she felt due
to a lack of family stability growing up).
83. See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING: THE CRIMINAL OPERATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN PIMP 5 (2006), http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/victims/humantrafficking/vs/documents/
Domestic_Sex_Trafficking_Guide.pdf; Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14, at 3.
84. See Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that pimps use physical
and psychological abuse to control girls); Youth Radio, supra note 72 (quoting a former CSEC
youth in Oakland about the rape, gang rape, and beatings she endured at the hands of her
pimp, and quoting members of the community who said it is common to see pimps beating the
girls they control).
85. See Amber, supra note 1, at 168-69; Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14.
86. MISSEY [sic] Data Report, MISSSEY (June 2009), http://www.misssey.org/documents/
data_report_final.pdf. Pimps may even specifically target group homes to recruit youth. LINDA
A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT’L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC MINOR SEX
TRAFFICKING 31, 58 (2009). 
87. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86. 
88. Id. at 5.
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These basic factors of vulnerability exist in CSEC youth of all
ages. Had Tasha been fifteen when she first came under the control
of a pimp, for example, it would make little sense to no longer
consider her a victim once she turned sixteen and remained trapped
in that relationship. Even at age sixteen, Tasha’s situation as a
CSEC youth would still have resulted from an adult exploiting her
vulnerabilities by recruiting her into prostitution.
Many older CSEC youth may be even more vulnerable to pimp
coercion than younger CSEC youth because they have young
children of their own.89 This concern is particularly relevant in
Alameda County, where nearly 20 percent of CSEC teens are
mothers.90 In these cases, the pimp can use a girl’s baby as another
source of leverage over her.91 For example, he may manipulate her
by threatening to hurt the child or by threatening to withdraw his
financial support if she were to leave prostitution.92 Additionally,
threats to turn the girl over to the police may carry extra weight
when it means that she will be separated from her baby.93 Because
older teens may be more likely to have a child at this point in their
lives, in this respect they may actually be more vulnerable than
younger teens. Consequently, there is a compelling argument for
providing immunity to CSEC youth in Alameda County regardless
of their age.
3. Protecting Youth Regardless of Their Cooperation with       
the Court
Immunity would also resolve the danger of prosecuting youth
who, for various reasons resulting from their exploitation, are
unable to cooperate with the court. Alameda County’s diversion
policy requires a CSEC youth like Tasha to provide information
sufficient to demonstrate that she was coerced into prostitution.94
Many youth, however, are unwilling to provide this information,
89. Frequently Asked Questions, CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT (Nov. 18, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.childrenofthenight.org/faq.html.
90. See MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
91. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 89.
92. See id.
93. See Amber, supra note 1, at 166; Golke, supra note 6, at 209.
94. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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instead choosing to accept a conviction.95 Some refrain from sharing
this information in order to protect their pimps. Such a desire may
result from trauma bonding that many CSEC youth experience with
their exploiter.96 Other youth refuse to provide this information
because they distrust authority figures, such as police officers and
court officials.97 This distrust is common among CSEC youth in
Alameda County, given that so many come from unstable family and
home environments.98 Still, other youth may refuse to provide
information because they fear retaliation from their pimp. This
problem is especially common in Alameda County, where pimps
have infiltrated juvenile justice facilities,99 sometimes even coming
to court while posing as a relative.100 
Even if a youth provides the information required to make her
eligible for diversion, the same barriers may still prevent her from
complying with the even greater level of cooperation required to
complete the entire program. A youth who may be willing to pro-
vide basic information regarding her exploitation may not be
interested in attending therapy that will ask her for more in-depth
information. Additionally, youth who begin diversion may later
95. Terry-Cobo, supra note 33.
96. Flynn, supra note 16 (discussing how, according to an OPD officer, “young sex workers
often do not want to cooperate because ‘they basically come out brainwashed’ to protect their
pimps”); Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14 (quoting an OPD officer who explained that
the CSEC youth she encounters are “both terrified of and attached to their pimps”). For
further reading on trauma bonding in CSEC youth, see Annitto, supra note 22, at 15.
97. See RIC CURTIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CSEC POPULATION IN NEW YORK
CITY: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, AND NEEDS 16 (2008); POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 83, at 5;
Annitto, supra note 22, at 60; County Grapples, supra note 28; Flynn, supra note 16 (quoting
an OPD officer who explains, “Every single one of [these CSEC youth] had been victims of
sexual assault at the hands of someone they trusted”); Lawmakers Creating Policy, supra note
72 (discussing the observations of the Alameda County Deputy District Attorney that one of
the toughest challenges police officers face is getting girls to cooperate with the police and the
court).
98. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., HUMAN SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DOMESTIC
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: AN INTERNAL ISSUE 14-15 (2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/organ
ization/113612.pdf (explaining how pimps exercise control over the girls even once they are
arrested, such as giving girls fake birth certificates to lie about their age and identity, and
quoting a former CSEC youth who explained her intense fear of being subjected to physical
violence by her pimp); County Grapples, supra note 28.
100. County Grapples, supra note 28.
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choose to return to their pimp without successfully completing the
diversion program.101
CSEC youth victims of exploitation by a pimp are arguably the
youth least deserving of criminal punishment. For the various
reasons explained above, however, such youth are often unlikely to
cooperate with the court. By requiring such cooperation as a pre-
requisite to diversion, Alameda County’s current policy effectively
criminalizes and denies protection to those who need it most.
Because nearly all CSEC youth in Alameda County are working for
a pimp,102 this issue will necessarily arise in almost every case in
which a youth is denied eligibility for diversion due to noncoopera-
tion. This issue could be entirely avoided, on the other hand, by a
policy of immunity.
4. Protecting Youth Trapped in Exploitation
Unlike alternative policies such as diversion, immunity would
protect CSEC youth facing repeat charges of prostitution. This issue
is especially relevant in Alameda County, where around 60 percent
of CSEC youth arrested for prostitution are facing repeat charges.103
Other policies like diversion become unavailable once a youth has
appeared in court on charges of prostitution a certain number of
times.104 Some who support such policies believe that although a girl
may deserve an initial chance to be seen as a victim, she should be
held criminally responsible if she later chooses to remain involved
in prostitution.105 In reality, however, many barriers prevent a
CSEC youth in Alameda County from exiting prostitution, even
after completing diversion.
101. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
102. Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14 (“Nearly all the girls on the streets are
controlled by pimps who claim their earnings.”). 
103. See County Grapples, supra note 28 (quoting the Chief Probation Officer of Alameda
County); MISSSEY, Framing the Issue of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 1
(2009), http://www.misssey.org/documents/framing_the_issue.pdf.
104. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(7) (2012); Flynn, supra note 16.
105. See HUMAN SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., supra note 99, at 10; Melissa Farley &
Vanessa Kelly, Prostitution: A Critical Review of the Medical and Social Sciences Literature,
11 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 29, PROSTITUTIONRESEARCH.COM, http://www.prostitutionresearch.
com/pdfs/Farley_Kelly.pdf, 27 (2007) (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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One such barrier is the fact that upon release from juvenile hall,
a girl continues to face many of the factors that led her into the sex
industry in the first place, such as a lack of financial resources,
mental health issues, and a lack of stable family relationships or
housing.106 Data shows that these barriers are especially prevalent
for CSEC youth in Alameda County, as they display high rates of
housing instability, family instability,107 psychiatric problems,108
trauma from sexual assault,109 parenthood,110 dropping out of school,
and leaving alternative employment.111 Detention may even exac-
erbate some of these factors by disrupting a youth’s involvement in
education programs or by severing positive social relationships she
may have formed before detention.112 
In addition to these practical barriers, a CSEC youth often faces
enormous psychological barriers that may prevent her from
successfully leaving prostitution. After being released from her
arrest, the CSEC youth likely will face continued coercion from her
pimp.113 Most CSEC youth in Oakland are victims of domestic
violence.114 Studies confirm that leaving such relationships is
typically a slow, gradual process involving relapse, rather than a
sudden, clean break.115 As a result, a girl’s recidivism, though
unfortunate, may be natural.
Because many barriers prevent CSEC youth from escaping
exploitation even after initial arrests, recidivism upon release from
detention is not a failure for which they should be held criminally
culpable. Rather, CSEC youth in this situation are simply victims
106. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 79-81.
108. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110. One study in Oakland found that about twenty percent of CSEC youth were mothers.
MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
111. One-third of CSEC youth in Oakland reported that they had dropped out of school and
one-third had left previous employment. See MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
112. FRANCINE T. SHERMAN, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION
REFORM: DETENTION REFORM AND GIRLS—CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 19 (2005), http://www.
aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/jdai_pathways_girls.pdf.
113. See Flynn, supra note 16.
114. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
115. See Victoria L. Banyard et al., Sexual Violence Prevention: The Role of Stages of
Change, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 111, 114 (2010); Therese Zink et al., Medical Man-
agement of Intimate Partner Violence Considering the Stages of Change: Precontemplation and
Contemplation, 2 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 231, 232 (2004).
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of continued criminal exploitation. The law should treat them as
such by providing them immunity from prosecution. 
B. Preventing Harm to CSEC Youth
In addition to protecting youth from wrongful prosecution, a
policy of immunity in Alameda County would also protect youth
from the harm they experience under diversion. 
1. Harm Caused by Criminal Detention
One of the most important goals promoted by immunity is the
protection and rehabilitation of CSEC youth from physical and
psychological harm.116 Under other policies such as diversion, CSEC
youth like Tasha are detained prior to, and sometimes after, a court
hearing. Studies have found that the experience of detention
negatively affects the psychological health of minor females in
unique ways. For instance, the isolation of detention leads to higher
rates of trauma and greater damage to positive self-image for female
youth detainees than it does for male youth detainees.117 This harm
to female detainees is especially relevant in Alameda County, as
nearly all CSEC youth are female.118
CSEC youth who are coping with mental health issues and
histories of sexual abuse are especially vulnerable to the psychologi-
cal harm caused by detention. This issue is particularly problematic
in Alameda County, where a high percentage of CSEC youth report
histories of sexual abuse119 and an extremely high percentage
experience severe mental health issues.120 Notably, one study of
CSEC youth in Alameda County found that 25 percent had clinical
depression, 24 percent had attempted suicide, 49 percent had been
116. See, e.g., Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 12, supra note 61; Bill Analysis of Assembly
Bill 17, supra note 61.
117. See SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 19. 
118. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86. These percentages exceed the national average,
as an estimated 76 percent of CSEC youth in the entire United States are female, whereas
24 percent are male. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008 3 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
1/ojjdp/228479.pdf.
119. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
120. Id.
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hospitalized at some point, and 29 percent had been hospitalized for
psychiatric reasons.121 Indeed, even the director of an organization
working with CSEC youth at Alameda County juvenile hall
acknowledged the trauma that girls experience during their arrest,
detention, and court proceedings.122 Detention has further been
found to harm girls’ outside relationships, such as a relationship
with a child.123 This issue is especially problematic in Alameda
County, where many CSEC youth are mothers.124 A policy of
immunity would most effectively protect CSEC youth from these
negative consequences of diversion.
2. Indirect Harms
In addition to protecting CSEC youth from the various harms of
detention, immunity also may protect CSEC youth from other, more
indirect harms. For example, under policies such as diversion, the
possibility of arrest may deter CSEC youth like Tasha from seeking
the assistance of police to break away from a pimp.125 Girls may also
be less likely to seek medical treatment, public health services for
sexually transmitted diseases, or psychological counseling from a
school, for fear that doing so will lead to criminal charges of
prostitution.126 This issue is especially troubling in Alameda County,
where girls involved in prostitution display high rates of mental
health problems127 and sexually transmitted disease infections.128
Furthermore, pimps in Alameda County commonly use the possibil-
ity of arrest as another scare tactic to threaten girls in order to keep
them trapped in prostitution.129 A policy of immunity for youth
under eighteen would remove these barriers that prevent girls from
seeking help or from trying to leave their pimp.
121. Id.
122. County Grapples, supra note 28 (quoting the Executive Director of MISSSEY, who
said, “Putting girls through the criminal justice system further traumatizes them”).
123. See SHERMAN supra note 112, at 38; Terry-Cobo, supra note 33. 
124. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86.
125. See Annitto, supra note 22, at 28; Golke, supra note 6, at 209; Law, supra note 22, at
584-85 (noting a finding by the San Francisco Task Force on Prostitution that “prostitutes are
afraid to call the police ... for fear of being arrested themselves”).
126. See Annitto, supra note 22, at 28.
127. MISSEY Data Report, supra note 86, at 5.
128. County Grapples, supra note 28.
129. See Amber, supra note 1, at 166; Golke, supra note 6, at 209.
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C. Eliminating CSEC Prosecution
Finally, proponents of immunity in Alameda County have a
strong argument that this policy would more effectively further the
ultimate goal of ending CSEC exploitation altogether.
1. Freeing Police Resources 
By granting CSEC youth immunity from criminal prosecution,
police forces could devote more resources towards apprehending
pimps who run the CSEC market. Doing so would allow local and
state governments to combat the true criminals in this industry.130
Currently, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) arrests youth
involved in prostitution at much higher rates than it does pimps. In
2009 alone, for example, 76 youth in Oakland were arrested on
charges of prostitution.131 In contrast, over the course of four years,
from 2006 to 2010, only 148 pimps appeared before the court in
Alameda County, and only 110 received felony convictions.132 If time
and resources were no longer wasted arresting and prosecuting
youth, they could instead be spent arresting pimps and customers.
One OPD officer explained this by saying, “If we had more re-
sources, we would do more sweeps. We’d have decoys. You need
decoys to catch johns [customers] and you need more [undercover
police officers] to catch pimps.”133 Indeed, before OPD suffered a
budget cut in 2008, it used to catch a significantly higher number of
pimps and customers per night.134 Another OPD officer likewise
explained that the unit could do more undercover stings to arrest
pimps if it received a bigger overtime budget, as stings generally
130. See, e.g., Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 12, supra note 61; Bill Analysis of Assembly
Bill 17, supra note 61.
131. Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14 (citing statistics reported to the FBI in
2008).
132. Barbara Grady & Sarah Terry-Cobo, Alameda County DA’s Office: Crusade to Rescue
Youth, Prosecute Pimps, OAKLAND LOC. (May 6, 2010), http://live.oaklandlocal.com/article/
youth-trafficking-part-5.
133. Barbara Grady, Fighting Youth Trafficking: Recession, Weak Laws Make It Hard,
OAKLAND LOC. (May 5, 2010), http://live.oaklandlocal.com/article/youth-trafficking-part-3
(quoting an OPD officer).
134. Id.; see also Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14.
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require work during both the day and night.135 The department
could also arrest more pimps if it could afford better equipment,
such as undercover cars, which cannot be used repeatedly in stings
because pimps will begin to recognize them.136
Resources diverted away from arresting and prosecuting youth
additionally could be used to fund educational programs for
customers who solicit prostitution. These programs help buyers
understand their role in perpetuating the CSEC market.137 The
Director of the SAGE Project, an educational program for customers
in San Francisco, explains that such measures to reduce demand
may help eliminate commercial sexual exploitation more effectively
than measures aimed at reducing supply, such as arresting youth.138
In fact, a federally funded study in 2007 found that 95 percent of
customers who completed the SAGE Project program faced no
subsequent charges of soliciting prostitution.139
Funding that is no longer needed to arrest and detain youth
charged with prostitution could likewise be used to fund a statewide
task force to help police departments share knowledge and informa-
tion to more effectively combat the pimps who run the prostitution
industry. Such a task force would be especially effective in Califor-
nia, where pimps run prostitution “tracks” not only within specific
cities or counties but often between multiple areas throughout the
entire state.140
2. Obtaining Youth Cooperation with Law Enforcement 
In addition to freeing up resources, immunity could support law
enforcement efforts to combat pimps and customers by facilitating
greater cooperation from CSEC youth. Under the current diversion
policy, CSEC youth like Tasha are still largely treated as criminals,
as they are arrested, detained in juvenile hall, and judged in
135. Child Prostitution Growth, supra note 14.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Sarah Terry-Cobo, Solving Youth Trafficking: Educating “Johns” Curbs
Demand, OAKLAND LOC. (May 6, 2010), http://live.oaklandlocal.com/article/youth-trafficking-
part-4.
138. Id. 
139. Id.
140. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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court.141 In these situations, girls receive mixed messages from law
enforcement and the judicial system. On the one hand, they are told
that they are victims deserving protection, but at the same time,
they are treated as criminals.142 Law enforcement and the courts
may seem as controlling and untrustworthy as a pimp. As a result,
girls often refuse to cooperate.143 If CSEC youth saw police and the
courts as figures who could assist them in escaping prostitution,
rather than as figures who could arrest, detain, and convict them,
they might be more willing to work with law enforcement to catch
their pimps.144
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Critics of immunity often express concern that this policy will
fail to hold accountable certain youth who are not actually coerced
into prostitution, such as older teens, youth who sell themselves
without a pimp, and repeat offenders. As previously explained,
however, such concerns are ill founded in Alameda County, given
the nature of the CSEC market there. Nonetheless, many critics
worry because—even in Alameda County—the main argument
against immunity is that, unlike diversion, it provides CSEC youth
with no pathway out of prostitution. Nonetheless, data regarding
the actual situation in Alameda County shows that this concern,
too, may be misplaced.
First, although the current diversion program technically
provides a pathway out of prostitution, its overall effect may
actually harm CSEC youth more than it helps them, defeating the
point of the policy. As previously explained, in the current diversion
program youth are subjected to psychological harm when they are
treated as criminals during arrest, detention, and possible sentenc-
ing.145 The possibility of such criminal treatment often encourages
CSEC youth to remain in prostitution.146 A pimp can even use this
141. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
143. See Grady & Terry-Cobo, supra note 132; supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
144. See Annitto, supra note 22, at 28.
145. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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fear of criminal prosecution as leverage to increase his control over
the youth.147
Just as the current diversion policy presents great risk of harm
to CSEC youth, it provides little opportunity to actually help them
successfully leave prostitution. Diversion programs fail to eliminate
many of the issues that render youth vulnerable to coercion from a
pimp in the first place.148 For example, many CSEC youth who
complete a diversion program are still poor, have few familial or
social bonds, and generally lack housing.149 
Even if a diversion program is able to offer appropriate opportu-
nities for empowerment that could eliminate some of a youth’s risk
factors, the effectiveness of the program would remain limited by its
mandatory and short-term nature. Studies have shown that such
rehabilitation programs are most effective when youth enter them
voluntarily, as they are more invested in the process.150 Programs
also are more effective when youth have control over and a voice in
the services they receive, as this allows for the program to be
tailored to a youth’s individual needs.151 Finally, programs are most
effective when they provide long-term support and accommodate
periods of recidivism.152 Diversion policies lack these key features of
successful rehabilitation programs. 
A policy of immunity, on the other hand, could facilitate the
entrance of CSEC youth into effective voluntary rehabilitation
programs. As explained in Part III, CSEC youth might be more
willing to seek out help if they did not have to fear the risk of
criminal prosecution.153 Unlike diversion programs, which can last
no longer than the maximum conviction’s sentence for a prostitution
offense, voluntary programs could provide long-term support for
147. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
149. Flynn, supra note 16 (quoting the Director of MISSSEY’s explanation that “even with
a diversion program, eventually young women will return to a community where violence and
prostitution are prevalent. The conditions that created the vulnerabilities still exist.... They’re
not having their basic needs met.... [I]t essentially becomes a revolving door: arrest, detention,
back on the street, repeat”).
150. HEATHER J. CLAWSON & LISA GOLDBLATT GRACE, FINDING A PATH TO RECOVERY:
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR MINOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING 4 (2007), available
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/ResFac/ib.htm.
151. See SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 47; CLAWSON & GRACE, supra note 150, at 6.
152. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part III.B.1.
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youth and increase their likelihood of success. Voluntary programs
also would contain a number of other effective features lacking in
the diversion model, such as voluntary participation, accommoda-
tion of recidivism, and individually tailored support. Of course, the
main challenge under the immunity policy, then, would be for the
state of California and various nonprofit agencies to summon the
resources needed to expand upon the current network of voluntary
CSEC rehabilitation programs.
Given the high risk of harm and low chance of success inherent
in the diversion model, it should come as no surprise that Alameda
County’s diversion program does little to help CSEC youth and even
less to combat the sex industry. As previously explained, an
estimated 60 percent of CSEC youth facing charges in Alameda
County are repeat offenders154 for whom the diversion policy clearly
has not provided an effective pathway out of prostitution. Further-
more, the diversion policy fails CSEC youth in Alameda County on
a larger scale. Not only does the policy divert police resources away
from arresting pimps,155 but it also discourages CSEC youth from
assisting police efforts to do so.156 In contrast, a policy of immunity
avoids many of the problems created by the diversion program by
protecting exploited youth from unjustified prosecution. Immunity
also facilitates more effective policing against pimps and ultimately
promotes the elimination of CSEC exploitation.
154. County Grapples, supra note 28.
155. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Because Alameda County is an epicenter of the underage sex
trade, the policies it pursues will likely influence state and federal
legislators looking for a model to follow. A policy of immunity for
youth under eighteen, supported by many local advocates for CSEC
youth, would benefit Alameda County in ways that the current
diversion policy does not. Primarily, a policy of immunity for youth
under age eighteen would resolve tension with California laws
regarding statutory rape, buying sex from a minor, and selling a
minor for sex, as well as tension with federal TVPA law. Addition-
ally, a policy of immunity for youth under eighteen would properly
recognize CSEC youth as victims even in the event of recidivism,
even when they reach the ages of sixteen and seventeen, and even
when they are justifiably unable to cooperate with law enforcement
and court officials. What is more, immunity would more effectively
pursue the ultimate goal of eliminating CSEC exploitation by
freeing up police resources to focus on pimps and customers, by
facilitating the cooperation of CSEC youth with police efforts, and
by eliminating barriers that prevent CSEC youth from seeking help.
When deciding upon a policy to combat CSEC exploitation,
jurisdictions should consider the context of the policy within state
laws and the nature of the local CSEC market. In some places like
Alameda County, a policy of immunity for youth under eighteen
may be most appropriate. In other places, alternative policies may
be preferable. Either way, Alameda County can provide an appropri-
ate precedent for others to follow by conscientiously choosing a
policy appropriately tailored to its unique situation: namely,
immunity for youth under eighteen.
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